The Roots of Occasionalism? Causation, Metaphysical Dependence, and Soul-Body Relations in Augustine

Tamer Nawar

doi:10.1163/15685349-05904001

Abstract

Abstract It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine’s views about the causal and dependence relations between body and soul. He argues that, contrary to what is often thought, Augustine allows that corporeal objects do act upon souls and merely rules out that corporeal objects exercise a particular kind of causal power (that of efficient or sustaining causes). He clarifies how Augustine conceives of the kind of causal influence exercised by souls and bodies.

Highlights

Il [Augustin] n’a pas crû que le Corps agist sur l’ Ame en luy faisant recevoir ses passions, mais en luy donnant occasion d’ agir en mesme temps
He [Augustine] did not believe that the body acts upon the soul by making it receive its passions but by offering it an occasion to act at the same time
Dei 5.2–10; 7.28; Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum 5.41–42), Augustine’s own causal vocabulary often mirrors what we find in Cicero and Seneca,[52] and Augustine was deeply indebted to numerous adjacent Stoic and later Platonist views and discussions.[53]

Summary

Introduction*

Il [Augustin] n’a pas crû que le Corps agist sur l’ Ame en luy faisant recevoir ses passions, mais en luy donnant occasion d’ agir en mesme temps. For instance, some medieval philosophers, such as John Peckham, took themselves to be following Augustine in claiming that corporeal things do not act upon the soul in perception and are instead merely an occasion for the soul to act upon itself.[1] some early modern occasionalists, such as Louis de la Forge, took Augustine to agree with their own views and found in him an authoritative precedent for thinking that apparent corporeal causes might be demoted to mere occasions without genuine causal efficacy.[2] Such readings are prevalent in more recent studies of Augustine. Augustine allows that while corporeal items fall short of being efficient causes (i.e. they are not jointly active, productive, and sustaining), they may act upon other things – including the soul – in a fairly “robust” manner which goes beyond constituting mere background conditions or sine quibus non causes

The Limits of the Causal Influence of Bodies

Conclusion