Abstract

W1 7HEN Castro gained power in Cuba in 1958 it seemed to the democratic Left in Europe, and to rebels without a cause, that here was a revolution on the new frontier. Cuba appeared to have produced a revolution with a difference. Neither capitalist nor Communist, it would break the ideological stalemate, and so provide a model for the uncommitted third of the world. Disillusion was all the more profound, therefore, when the Cuba crisis of 1962 appeared to provide confirmation that Castro's revolution was but ' a variant in the family of Communist revolutions'. It seemed that those who had argued that Castroism was the best insurance against Communism would have to eat their words, while those who had always held that Castroism was a cloak for Communism felt their case had been proved. It is still too early for final judgments; the evidence is far too scanty and, above all, there is no simple explanation of Castro's complex personality. Until that can be explained, the revolution will make little sense-for in Cuban politics, as in those of Latin America generally, personalities are still the prime movers. But this much at least can be said: although Castro's motives may be obscure, and although his revolution has been overlaid by Cold War classifications, both he and it have their roots in Cuban history. For example, it is difficult to begin to understand Castro himself without considering the 19th-century nationalist Jose Marti (1853-1895), who has been a dominant intellectual influence on him. Unless, in short, the Castro Revolution is seen as a particular type of nationalist upheaval, closely conditioned by Cuban history, there is a danger that false analogies will be made with revolutionary situations elsewhere in Latin America.

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