Abstract
This paper explores the development and articulation of the agency and stakeholder theories of the firm and their corresponding logics of shareholder wealth maximisation and stakeholder interest optimisation. We note how these two perspectives have been viewed as diametrically opposite normative, instrumental and descriptive theories, despite efforts by some authors to find common ground. Each has served as a basis for firm governance. We explore the relationship of the agency and stakeholder theories to the conceptualisations of the roles of boards of directors, and how both theories hold value in understanding two board functions/roles: control/monitoring roles and service roles (which covers both resources and strategy).
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
