Abstract
The study examined the interplay of the two separate governance dimensions of dominant ownership and management control that differentially affected the prevalence of Principal-Agent (PA) and Principal-Principal (PP) conflicts, as well as their respective impacts on shareholder value. The sample comprised of 675 Indian firms examined during the period 2006–2015. Dominant family ownership reduced the negative impacts of PA conflicts, while exacerbating the negative impacts of PP conflicts on shareholder value. However, when family ownership was combined with non-family management, the negative effects of PA conflicts were minimized, while creating a favorable impact of PP conflicts on shareholder value. Thus, the governance configuration that minimizes the undesirable impacts of both types of agency conflicts and is conducive to encouraging stewardship behaviors appears to be one where the influence of dominant (viz., family) owners is balanced by the executive decisions of non-family managers (officiating in their roles as stewards).
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