The role of scenarios in paradoxes

Abstract

This paper fills a gap in the existing metaphilosophical research on paradoxes by focusing on the role of scenarios. Typical philosophical paradoxes contain a scenario description whose contribution to paradoxes remains unexplored. I argue that scenarios are examples or instantiations of the abstract schema of paradoxes. As such, scenarios contribute to paradoxes on two levels. First, they make the argument more concrete, thus enhancing the dialectical force of paradoxes and facilitating their understanding, especially for non-experts. This function is external to the paradox itself, but has important practical implications for the use of paradoxes and their effect on philosophical debates, and it contributes to explaining why philosophical paradoxes are usually introduced by a scenario. Second, and more crucially, scenarios are essential to the epistemic dimension of paradoxes. By definition, paradoxes have two necessary components: the argumentative structure and the plausibility/implausibility of the premises/conclusion. By providing examples of the abstract schema, scenarios contribute to making the premises plausible. In particular, scenarios are the source of plausibility and justification for those premises that contain an empirically grounded assertion of existence. Examples of such paradoxes are the Sorites paradox, the Lottery paradox, and the Grue paradox. Contrary to the dialectical role, the epistemic function of scenarios is indispensable, as it connects paradoxes to the real world and underscores their significance in specific debates.