The role of reputation to reduce punishment costs in spatial public goods game

Abstract

In the traditional spatial public goods game (SPGG), punishment mechanisms are considered an effective strategy to promote cooperation. However, in traditional punishment models, the high cost of punishment leads to ineffective cooperation promotion when the synergy factor is low. Therefore, this paper decides to establish a punishment model based on reputation to reduce the cost of punishment, to solve the above problems. Cooperation strategy can accumulate reputation as evolution progresses, where the high-reputation punishing group, acting as the 'main force' of law enforcement, can obtain stronger expulsion capabilities by reducing costs, and the decrease in the revenue difference with ordinary cooperators brings stronger survivability. The research compares the new punishment mechanism with traditional punishment mechanisms, finding that under low synergy factors, the reputation-based punishment model is more likely to achieve cooperation, and after introducing the reputation mechanism, it significantly enhances the promotive effect of punishers on system cooperation.