Abstract
An emphasis in jurisprudence on the rule of recognition drives a wedge between the recognition of institutions and persons, and seeks to limit the normative significance of law's recognitive practices. This article argues, against that position, that law's recognitive practices unavoidably engage the recognition of persons, by persons, and that legal theory must attend to the interaction between recognition of institutions and persons. Those matters become core concerns in contexts of claims to legal plurality, amidst the challenges of recognition posed by the interaction of legal orders and the persons subject to them. Drawing upon theories of recognition beyond jurisprudence, this work offers an account of ‘institutional recognition of persons’ to harness the normative potential of both law's institutions and persons, in order to respond to claims that legal plurality enables persons to be recognized by institutions and to recognize themselves in institutions.
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