The Role of Presidential Advisory Systems in US Foreign Policy-Making: The Case of the National Security Council and Vietnam, 1953-1961

Abstract

The historiography of Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency has undergone substantial shifts over the past two decades. While historians still debate Eisenhower's overall effectiveness, few accept the traditional assessment that he was a weak president. In The Role of Presidential Advisory Systems in US Foreign Policy-Making, Pasi Tuunainen definitely accepts the revisionist contention that Eisenhower was an effective president who utilized a carefully orchestrated advisory system to facilitate decision making. He arrives at this conclusion after using the development of Eisenhower's policies toward Vietnam as a case study for evaluating the effectiveness of the National Security Council (NSC) in presidential decision making. His study fills a definite void in the Eisenhower historiography and should be consulted by anyone studying either the NSC or American involvement in Vietnam in the 1950s. Tuunainen uses the multiple advocacy model as formulated by Alexander L. George to test the effectiveness of the NSC in providing advice to the Eisenhower administration concerning Vietnam. He traces the development and evolution of Eisenhower's Vietnam policies by carefully examining the discussions and debates in the NSC and its subordinate structures such as the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. He reveals that the situation in Vietnam was discussed in 20 percent of the NSC meetings from 1953 to 1961 and at times, especially in 1954 and 1955, was consistently one of the most important issues on the council's agenda. He argues that Eisenhower viewed those meetings as important, encouraged free-flowing ideas, debate, and discussion, and received careful, if sometimes flawed, advice.