Abstract

ABSTRACTThis paper analyses the burden sharing decisions of two Canadian prime ministers, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, regarding the U.S.-led coalition that sought to “degrade and ultimately defeat” the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, primarily through an aerial bombing campaign initiated on 8 August 2014. More specifically, it explains Harper’s decision in October 2014 to contribute six CF-18 fighters to take part in combat operations during this intervention and Trudeau’s decision in February 2016 to recall these aircraft by the end of that month. Many studies of burden sharing focus on static rational incentives to explain long-term trends in a state’s contributions to an alliance or coalition, which suggest that both prime ministers should have made consistent, minimal contribution to the intervention. In contrast, this study argues that the leader of a small, weak state’s decisions about contributing combat resources to coalition military interventions are strongly influenced by the leader’s willingness to adhere to the constraints associated with being a small, weak member of a coalition. Leaders whose personalities encourage them to challenge constraints are less likely, all else being equal, to contribute combat resources to coalition military interventions than leaders whose personalities encourage them to respect constraints.

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