Abstract
ABSTRACT The relationship between interest groups and national governments in shaping the decision-making in the Council of the EU is still largely unobserved. By focusing on the case study of Croatia, this article contests the general assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism about the process and character of national preference formation and demonstrates that economic and societal interests do not have primacy in influencing a national government’s positions in the Council. It is argued that the legacy of a country’s EU accession process, coupled with weak oversight and accountability mechanisms, are among the most important factors in explaining the government's non-inclusive management of EU affairs.
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