Abstract
The distinction between strong and weak veridicality is explained, and by drawing on this distinction, it is argued that experiences have both singular and non-singular contents. The Argument from Appearing from Chapter 2 is adapted to states of seeing, yielding an argument that states of seeing have both singular and non-singular contents. It is also argued that phenomenal states are distinct from states of seeing, and that Naive Realism is probably false.
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