THE ROLE OF INTENTIONALITY IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION

Abstract

foundations of this discipline. The major classics of phenomenology of religion, such as Mircea Eliade's Patterns in Comparative Religion and The Sacred and Profane, or Gerardus van der Leeuw's Religion in Essence and Manifestation, perhaps properly devote very little attention to philosophical assumptions on which their entire effort is based. Instead, eschewing elaborate digressions, they devote themselves to the things themselves. Yet for lesser phenomenologists indifference to or ignorance of philosophical consequences of their methods can lead to serious distortions. Phenomenological philosophy has itself changed over years; so adherence to older assumptions may not always be justified. Who indeed can be sure that even above-mentioned leaders in phenomenology of religion have succeeded in entirely avoiding problematical areas, knowledgeable though they obviously are in their craft? It may therefore be useful to turn back to founders of phenomenology as such, to determine major varieties of approach, with implications that flow from each, and their consequences for study of religion. Our own study naturally cannot hope to be comprehensive; in following remarks we shall merely trace some of main lines of phenomenologists of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, whom I take to be representative of two quite different lines of a single tradition. Our chief interest will be in varying ways intentionality has been treated by these two thinkers. Following these surveys, some applications to study of religion will be ventured.