The Role of Intelligence in Fighting Insurgencies

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain why powerful states have struggled to defeat insurgencies after World War II despite their superiority in wealth and military power. I examine the U.S experience in Iraq and Vietnam, building on the argument that the asymmetry of information favoring insurgencies can partly explain their success. I argue that powerful states’ efforts to understand the insurgency may, ironically, increase their enemies’ understanding of them, thereby undermining their efforts. As they seek to understand the enemy, they become more visible, thus increasing their vulnerability. As they deploy technology to gather information, seek indigenous allies, or increase patrols, they expose more of their organizations’ routines and practices, providing insurgents a valuable information advantage. Powerful militaries require clear, routine procedures to function, have complex logistics “tails,” and a broad array of units requiring coordination. The technology they deploy sends identifiable signals that make them more predictable. Thus, powerful states’ costly and well-coordinated efforts to succeed in fighting insurgencies can undermine their ability to do so.