Abstract
This article discusses the role of inhibition as a component of executive functions in metaphorical embodiment of concepts and explains some incongruent evidence for metaphorical embodiment. Some past works have explained the incongruent evidence for metaphorical embodiment of concepts on the basis of conventionality/novelty of metaphors. Based on theories of embodiment, when a word that refers to an object is used in its literal sense, all sensorimotor networks that are involved in perceiving the object are activated, and sensorimotor features of the object are embodied. However, when the same word is used in a metaphorical sense as the base of a metaphor, only a single salient semantic feature that defines the metaphorical meaning of the word is embodied. The other semantic features, which are metaphorically irrelevant, are inhibited during metaphor comprehension. The activation/embodiment of the salient metaphorically-relevant feature and the inhibition of metaphorically-irrelevant features are dependent on base-target relationship, contextual information, and conventionality/novelty of metaphorical expression. Therefore, meaning of a single term can be metaphorically embodied in a variety of ways in different situations and in different metaphorical expressions. It is suggested that this can be one reason for non-congruency of evidence for metaphorical embodiment of concepts.
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