The role of inductive generalizations in Sellars' theory of explanation

Abstract

Wilfrid Sellars' theory of explanation is a rich and complicated analysis of a most complex issue. It is based on his commitment to scientific realism and to his belief that any adequate philosophy of science must provide the foundation for a theory of scientific development ([8]-[13]). In what follows I provide a partial explication of Sellars' account of explanation in which I show how using Sellars' approach provides a coherent integration of statistical generalizations into the discussion of explanation. My point of departure is Hempel's attempt to solve the Theoretician's Dilemma ([2]) by requiring that theories provide not only for deductive systematization, but inductive systematization as well. Sellars, I argue, provides the justification for what Hempel only assumes. He does so at some cost, however. We are forced to give up the primacy of the deductive-nomological model of explanation, D-N. This is not to say that we must abandon it, but rather subsume it under Sellar's more general account. In general, I will be quite brief with respect to what I have to say about Hempel. His view simply has to be assumed as the starting point.