Abstract
In this study, we investigate the role of payoff information and conformity in improving network performance in a traffic dilemma known as the Braess paradox. Our goal is to understand when decisions are guided by selfish motivations or otherwise by social ones. For this purpose, we consider the manipulation of others' choice, public and private monitoring and information on distribution of choices. Data show that when social comparison was not salient, participants were more cooperative. By contrast, cooperativeness of others' choice made participants more competitive leading to traffic and collective performance decrease. The implications of these findings to the literature on social dilemmas are discussed.
Highlights
The operation of transportation and communication in modern societies relies on networks (Rapoport et al, 2009)
In this study we present the Braess paradox as a paradigm to test some factors used in social psychology literature
We presented a traffic network based on a commons dilemma known as the Braess paradox and tried to reduce the exploitative behavior by making some crucial social processes salient
Summary
The operation of transportation and communication in modern societies relies on networks (Rapoport et al, 2009). For this reason, the management and the improvement of such networks are becoming essential problems in modern society. When considering networks, according to Rapoport et al (2006) one of the main questions to be addressed is how behavior adapts to changes in the network structure in decentralized systems. Answers to this question could be interesting for both managers and scientists
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