Abstract
This paper develops an extended emotional model in the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma game. It fills a gap in the traditional imitation mechanism by assuming that players do not simply imitate pure strategies, but imitate the emotional profiles of one another instead. The relationship between emotional profiles and strategy are constructed and Monte Carlo simulations are performed on a square lattice. Simulation results reveal that with an increase in the temptation parameter T (1⩽T⩽2), the order-chaos-order transition occurs. When T is around 1.2, we find that a bifurcation occurs. From a social system perspective, as T increases, the system changes from a benign one (respect for the ‘successful’ people and sympathy towards the weak one) to one that is of vicious nature (that is, bully the weak and fear the strong).
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