Abstract

The research aims to find the impact of ownership retention, managerial ownership, and boards on value IPO premium and underpricing. We investigate by using hand collect data 202 IPO prospectuses during 2008-2017 and using Warp PLS 5.0 to compute the data. Our finding suggests that may use to guide the investor in making informed decisions to see the level of the proportion of sharehold by old ownership and management. When the high level of ownership retention and managerial ownership, make the value IPO premium and underpricing will be high. On the other hand duality of the managerial role in firms making the value will be achieved. This paper contributes to the value of IPO premium and underpricing literature when influence by ownership share on initial public offerings context of emerging markets.Keywords: Ownership retention; Managerial Ownership; Boards; IPO premium; underpricing

Highlights

  • Good Corporate Governance requires good management in an organization

  • This study aims to see the effect of Ownership retention, Managerial Ownership, and Board on the value initial public offering (IPO) premium of the company's

  • The difference with the previous research, that the sample in this study looked at the role of manager ownership as well as the owner of the company towards the IPO premium value and stock performance in the Indonesian capital market during the period 2008-2017

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Good Corporate Governance requires good management in an organization. According to Gul et al (2012) corporate governance mechanisms are mechanisms that protect the interests of shareholders. The corporate governance mechanism is a system that can provide protection and guarantees of rights to stakeholders, including shareholders, lenders, employees, executives, government, customers, and other stakeholders. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) corporate governance is a way or mechanism to convince capital owners to obtain an appropriate return or return from their investment. Yermack (1996) states that there are two indicators of the first corporate governance mechanism of internal corporate governance mechanisms proxied by the number of directors, the proportion of independent commissioners, and debt to equity. The size of external corporate governance mechanisms proxied by institutional ownership

Objectives
Methods
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.