Abstract
The purpose of this article is to develop an epistemology of scientific models in scientific research practices, and to show that disciplinary perspectives have crucial role in such an epistemology. A transcendental (Kantian) approach is taken, aimed at explanations of the kinds of questions relevant to the intended epistemology, such as “How is it possible that models provide knowledge about aspects of reality?” The approach is also pragmatic in the sense that the questions and explanations must be adequate and relevant to concrete scientific practice. First it is explained why the idea of models as representations in terms of similarity or isomorphism between a model and its target is too limited as a basis for this epistemology. An important finding is that the target-phenomenon is usually not something that can be observed in a straightforward manner, but requires both characterization in terms of measurable variables and subsumption under (scientific) concepts. The loss of this basis leads to a number of issues, such as: how can models be interpreted as representations if models also include conceptually meaningful linguistic content; how can researchers identify non-observable real-world target-phenomena that are then represented in the model; how do models enable inferential reasoning in performing epistemic tasks by researchers; and, how to justify scientific models. My proposal is to deal with these issues by analyzing how models are constructed, rather than by looking at ready-made models. Based on this analysis, I claim that the identification of phenomena and the construction of scientific models is guided and also confined by the disciplinary perspective within which researchers in a scientific discipline have learned to work. I propose a Kuhnian framework by which the disciplinary perspective can be systematically articulated. Finally, I argue that harmful forms of subjectivism, due to the loss of the belief that models objectively represent aspects of reality, can be overcome by making the disciplinary perspective(s) in a research project explicit, thereby enabling its critical assessment, for which the proposed Kuhnian framework provides a tool.
Highlights
This article aims at developing an epistemology of scientific models
This leads to the question: “What is meant by the idea that models represent a targetphenomenon?” When oriented at scientific practice and the epistemic uses of models, an epistemology of scientific models must address: “How is it possible that humans gain knowledge about aspects of reality by scientific models?” This points at a more specific question: “How is it possible that scientific models allow for epistemic tasks and inferential reasoning by humans?” assuming that scientific models are used for performing epistemic tasks raises the question: “How are scientific models justified?” It will appear that the notion of ‘the targetphenomena represented by the model’ requires attention, in particular when scientific models represent target-phenomena that are not observable in a straight-forward manner
This section aims to show that the semantic view offers a straightforward account of the representational relationship between scientific models and real-world target-phenomena, but that this account is too limited as an epistemology of scientific models in scientific research practices
Summary
This article aims at developing an epistemology of scientific models. The focus is on empirical and experimental research practices that work in the context of concrete societal or (socio-)technological challenges. I will argue that the role of disciplinary perspectives is crucial to an adequate epistemology of scientific models in these practices. This leads to the question: “What is meant by the idea that models represent a targetphenomenon?” When oriented at scientific practice and the epistemic uses of models, an epistemology of scientific models must address: “How is it possible that humans gain knowledge about aspects of reality by scientific models?” This points at a more specific question: “How is it possible that scientific models allow for epistemic tasks and inferential reasoning by humans?” assuming that scientific models are used for performing epistemic tasks raises the question: “How are scientific models justified?” It will appear that the notion of ‘the targetphenomena represented by the model’ requires attention, in particular when scientific models represent target-phenomena that are not observable in a straight-forward manner This introduces two additional questions: “What is a phenomenon?” and “How is it possible that models represent non-observable target-phenomena?” Having addressed these questions in the first part of this article, in the second part I will argue that disciplinary perspectives form an inherent part of the proposed epistemology of scientific models.
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