The role of directors with multiple board seats and earnings quality: A Singapore context

Abstract

AbstractThis article explores whether multiple directorships has an influence on earnings management for Singaporean publicly listed firms. This article attempts to determine whether boards with multiple directorships are effective monitors and able deterrents of earnings management activities. Drawing on resource dependence theory, the results suggest that directors with multiple board seats will be able to tap on external resources for information, skills, and financial resources using their board connectedness. Data analysis is based on publicly listed firms on Singapore Stock Exchange (SSE) with a final pooled sample of 1,404 firm‐year observations from 2015 to 2018. Findings of this study show that with a higher level of multiple directorships, there is a significant negative relationship with the level of earnings management, where earnings management is measured by Dechow et al. (The Accounting Review, 1995, 70, 193–225) Modified Jones model and the Kothari et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005, 39, 163–197) performance‐adjusted model. We also find that firms in Singapore that have a higher number of multiple directorships on its board, will have a lower level of tolerance on income‐increasing earnings manipulation. Notable secondary findings of this study include a significant negative relationship between the proportion of female directors on the board with the level of earnings management (income‐increasing manipulations). Additionally, it is found that the engagement of Big Four auditors has no significant relationship with the level of earnings management in the context of Singaporean firms. This study has significant implications and contributions to the theoretical applications and policy reforms, specifically pertaining to the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance on the issue of multiple directorships.