Abstract
In this review of Andrei Marmor's book, Social Conventions: From Language to Law, I offer two objections to Marmor's claim that rules of recognition are best thought of as constitutive conventions. First, even if rules of recognition exist, it is doubtful whether all such rules satisfy Marmor's requirements for something to be a convention. Some rules of recognition may not be supported even by pro tanto reasons or, if they are, they may not be arbitrary in the way Marmor claims that conventions are. Second, even if rules of recognition exist and are conventional, it is doubtful whether they play the role in constituting legal practice that Marmor ascribes to them.
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