Abstract

The constitution of the United States assigns power over foreign policy to both the legislative branch (congress) and the executive branch (the president). That separation, or sharing, of powers has led to differing views on the ability and desirability of congress to participate in making foreign policy. The pattern of legislativeexecutive relations is long and complex, with successive periods of congressional and presidential dominance. During the first twentyfive years after World War n, the congressional role in foreign policy progressed through four relatively distinct phases described as accommodation, antagonism, acquiescence, and ambiguity,1 but the president generally took the leading role throughout the period. Then in the 1970s, largely because of mounting dissatisfaction with the executive secrecy and abuse of power associated with Vietnam and Watergate, but in part because of internal changes within the legislative branch, congress began to assert itself strongly in the foreign policy area, imposing restrictions on presidential action and initiating new policy objectives. More recently, the early 1980s have brought a seeming retreat from that assertive role, as a variety of measures have been enacted to repeal certain restrictions imposed in the previous decade and to increase presidential flexibility. The important question remaining is whether these policy reversals mark a decline in the importance of the role of congress, or whether a qualitative change in the role of congress occurred in the 1970s,

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