Abstract

By analysing Swiss common pool resource (CPR) institutions, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on comanagement while demonstrating how important it is to take into account the structuring role played by public policies in the regulation of natural resource use in western countries characterized by significant state intervention. The comparative analysis of three detailed case studies dealing with hunting, flood protection and landscape management policies leads to three main conclusions: (1) CPR institutions strengthen the coherence of resource regimes to the extent that they constitute social institutions which can facilitate the mediation process, i.e. the transformation of the collective identity, self-perception and, therefore, behaviour of policy target groups in the direction defined by the stated policy objectives; (2) one of the main conditions for the perpetuation of CPR institutions is their capacity to organize their activities around a collective problem defined as such by a policy; (3) the integration of CPR institutions into the political-administrative arrangement contributes to the reinforcement of the functional and territorial coordination between payers, decision makers and beneficiaries in regional and local institutional regimes.

Highlights

  • The theory of the commons has been enhanced by successive developments involving the improved allowance for the complexity of real life institutional arrangements

  • By analysing Swiss common pool resource (CPR) institutions, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on comanagement while demonstrating how important it is to take into account the structuring role played by public policies in the regulation of natural resource use in western european countries characterized by significant state intervention

  • The strength of CPR landscape institutions lies in the mediation process they can engage on a larger scale among heterogeneous groups of actors, theoretically, their capacity for establishing more coherent regulation

Read more

Summary

Introduction

The theory of the commons has been enhanced by successive developments involving the improved allowance for the complexity of real life institutional arrangements. Starting from relatively simple models based on the study of common pool resource (CPR) institutions in the purest form, operating under the most unadulterated conditions possible (Ostrom 1990), interest has grown in more complex commons, such as global commons (Ostrom et al 2002; Berkes 2006) involving multiple spatial, temporal, and institutional levels (Cash et al 2006). The institutions regulating such complex resource use situations have been conceptualized in terms of comanagement (Jentoft 1989; Berkes and Folke 1998), which deals with problems arising from cross-level interaction. We adopt Ostrom’s definition of CPR institutions as clearly defined groups of individuals who, while defining a set of rules regulating their use of the resource in accordance with local conditions, create a long-enduring local institutional arrangement capable of monitoring the actions of members vis-avis the resource, resolving conflicts, and administering sanctions to offenders (for a detailed discussion of these criteria, see Ostrom 1990, p. 90)

Objectives
Methods
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call