Abstract

A theory is presented about the functions of caucusing (private meetings between the mediator and disputant) in mediation. Empirical results that confirm and extend a number of propositions from the theory are also presented. Two coders, content analyzing both mediator and disputant behavior, observed 51 hearings at the Dispute Settlement Center of Western New York. Results indicated that disputants in caucus sessions employed less direct hostility, provided more information, and proposed more new alternatives than in joint sessions. Mediators, in parallel fashion, were more likely to request information and to challenge the disputants to come up with new alternatives. Mediators also exhibited more freedom to violate the neutrality norms during caucus sessions, giving greater support to the side that originally filed the complaint. These results support the use of caucusing as a route to issue identification and problem solving. However, other results showed that disputants were especially likely to boost their own position and put the other party down during caucus sessions, suggesting that mediators must be wary of what they learn from one party when the other is out of the room.

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