Abstract

This study examines whether the issuance of capital expenditure forecasts facilitates debt contracting by acting as a commitment to not engage in the expropriation of lenders through opportunistic investment activities. We find that firms with higher leverage and lower credit quality are more likely to issue capital expenditure forecasts. Furthermore, for firms that issue capital expenditure forecasts, loan spreads are lower and investment efficiency is greater, and these associations are stronger when the forecasts are more credible. We do not find similar results for earnings forecasts. When comparing the roles of capital expenditure covenant (which typically specify the upper limit of the allowed amount) with capital expenditure forecast, we find that the former reduces overinvestments and the latter reduces underinvestments. These results suggest that capital expenditure forecasts can be a commitment mechanism to reduce contracting costs with creditors. JEL Classification: G31; M4

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