Abstract

The decision-making process in Egypt at the ruling time of its fourth president Hosni Mubarak was dominated by the president and a very small core group composed mainly, but not exclusively, of advisers whom he appointed and dismissed. The level of their influence on his decisions was almost wholly dependent on their accessibility to Mubarak himself. Towards the end of his rule, President Mubarak was no longer capable of resuming his duties effectively. Therefore, several of these issues were brought under the responsibility of the ruling elite, whereas other issues were left to be handled by the relevant ministry. It became possible for some parts of the bureaucracy to make a significant impact on foreign policy, particularly on topics not of interest to the ruling elite. This should not negate the effect of the internal dynamics of the foreign ministry on the operationalization of the institution and subsequently on its ability to execute mandates efficiently. Also, some institutions and ‘quasi-foreign policy agencies’ had a role, however small, on foreign policy outcomes and competed with the foreign ministry. Thus, the argument remains that the bureaucratic institution, despite its subordinate role, is partly responsible for Egypt’s foreign policy unhappy ending under Mubarak.

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