The Rising Shi’a Crescent: Iranian Smart Power and Implications for the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf

Natalia Paunic

doi:10.22215/cria.v3i0.120

Abstract

The circumstances of the American war in Iraq, the Arab Spring, and the international fight against Da’esh have provided an opportunity for the Islamic Republic of Iran to consolidate its power in the Middle East, as foretold by King Abdullah II of Jordan in his coining of the phrase “Shi’a crescent” in 2004. Iran’s successful resurgence can be attributed to its effective use of “smart power,” or the combination of soft and hard power tactics. Iran’s hard power, in the form of Shi’a militias and proxies, is supported with soft power tactics. These include Iran’s export of the ideals of the Revolution and its model of an Islamic Republic, its role as leader of the global Shi’ite community, and its investment in cultural diplomacy across the Middle East as well as its renewed engagement with the West.

Highlights

In 2004, in an article for the Washington Post, King Abdullah II of Jordan voices his concerns over Iranian meddling in the January elections in Jordan and Iraq
He uses a new term, the Shi’a “crescent,”[1] to describe a resurgent Iran and its imminent domination of the Middle East, caused by the destabilizing nature of the American war in Iraq.[2]. He voices his fears that Iranian control will spread to other Sunni countries, noting that “even Saudi Arabia is not immune from this.”[3]
The improvement of Iran’s geopolitical position due to the relative weakening of its neighbours, paired with Washington’s policy blunders and the awakening of Shi’a populations in light of the encouragement of democracy by the West has “opened up a strategic opportunity...for Iran to balance US power in the region.”[6]. But unlike the United States, whose use of hard power in the war in Iraq failed to encourage domestic support from Iraqis, Iran has implemented an effective policy of smart power, as defined by Joseph Nye

Summary

Introduction

In 2004, in an article for the Washington Post, King Abdullah II of Jordan voices his concerns over Iranian meddling in the January elections in Jordan and Iraq. The improvement of Iran’s geopolitical position due to the relative weakening of its neighbours, paired with Washington’s policy blunders and the awakening of Shi’a populations in light of the encouragement of democracy by the West has “opened up a strategic opportunity...for Iran to balance US power in the region.”[6] But unlike the United States, whose use of hard power in the war in Iraq failed to encourage domestic support from Iraqis, Iran has implemented an effective policy of smart power, as defined by Joseph Nye. Iran has several soft power tools at its disposal including the revolutionary ideals of 1979, its position as leader of Shi'a Islam, and its cultivation of regional social, political, and cultural links. This paper will discuss the soft power tools at Iran’s disposal and how it has used them to compliment hard power tactics in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf, amounting to an effective use of smart power by a rational international. Unlike the United States, Iran softens its hard power tactics with a desire to improve diplomatic relations with other countries in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf, thereby improving its diplomatic position

Iran and the Model of the Islamic Republic

Iranian Cultural Diplomacy

Conclusion

Works Cited