THE RISE AND FALL OF SERFDOM IN CHINA: A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article uses contract theory and institutional change theory to make suggestions about the factors underlying the rise and fall of serfdom in China. The article defines serfdom as a labour contract in which serfs worked for their owners instead of paying land rent and taxes. In terms of institutional theory it follows that serfdom prevailed in the Xia, Shang and Western Zhou Dynasties because the transaction costs of serfdom were lower than all possible alternative contracts under the prevailing conditions. It also follows that during the Spring-Autumn and Warring States Periods the transaction costs of serfdom began to exceed the costs of other possible contracts because of wider social changes. As a result, serfdom was gradually replaced by the private ownership of land and other more efficient contracts. This article seeks to clarify some of the conceptual issues relating to the application of institutional theory to understanding these processes in Chinese history. Its aim is to point to new research initiatives that could either confirm or reject the hypotheses presented here.