The Rise and Fall of Bureaucratic Rationalization: Exploring the Possibilities and Limitations of the UN Secretariat in Conflict Prevention

Abstract

If it is correct to say that the UN's policy has been dominated by great powers, then it is also true that the academic debate on the UN's failures in general, and the Rwandan tragedy in particular, has been dominated by an emphasis on Realpolitik , which has limited and precluded analysis of other possible causes of the UN's malfunctions. Power politics alone cannot fully explain why the downfall of `grand strategies' for the UN envisaged in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace (1992), most notably conflict prevention, was almost as rapid as their emergence. By drawing upon new empirical evidence from interviews and by reflecting on theories of bureaucratization, this article explores one previously ignored mechanism underlying the failure of the Agenda in general and the Rwandan case in particular, namely bureaucratic rationalization. It is argued that bureaucratic rationalization delineates the political manoeuvring space for the UN Secretariat. Bureaucratic thinking is a double-edged sword whose functions may generate severe side-effects in conflict prevention. Its main function is to attain enhanced efficiency, accuracy and stability of decision-making, but sometimes this comes as a Pyrrhic victory. The downside, or dysfunction, of bureaucratization is strict categorization and mechanic behaviour. With regard to the Rwandan case, this article presents new information on the way in which the failure of the UN bureaucracy to overcome the strict separation between the peace settlement and the preventive deployment of peacekeeping operations contributed to the failure to prevent the genocide.