The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict

Abstract

IntroductionIn August 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) stunned the world by capturing Iraq's second largest city, Mosul, sending shockwaves across the world. About 800 ISIS fighters routed an estimated 30,000 Iraqi Security Forces, who threw away their weapons and uniforms, and fled for safety. In a matter of weeks ISIS fighters had captured several other Sunni dominated provinces including Nineveh, Salahuddin, and parts of Diyala, reaching the outskirts of Iraqi capital, Baghdad. Even more shocking was the massacre of 1,700 Iraqi soldiers and the displacement of roughly half a million people who escaped the atroci- ties of the terrorist group in the wake of its sweeping advances. Shortly after taking Mosul, the group formally changed its name to the Islamic State, inviting all Muslims to immigrate to the newly founded Caliphate. The atrocities committed by the IS caused one of the most serious refugee and humanitarian crises since the end of World War II and the group is considered as one of the most serious threats to international security.This paper addresses two parallel issues: How-and to what extent-did both the US intervention in 2003 and sectarian conflict contribute to the rise and consolidation of Islamic State? Using a case study methodology, the research focuses on abovementioned factors for the following three reasons. First, there is an academic and research gap regarding these two factors in Iraq's case. Many papers have been written on IS which discuss different aspects of the group and many politicians have blamed the US intervention and sectarian policies of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq for the rise of the group. However, there is little systematic analysis in academic literature regarding these two factors and their contributing mechanism. Second, these two factors are considered the most important contributors to the rise and consolidation of IS. And third, research and analysis on these two factors could have significant policy implications not only in dealing with IS but also for future external interventions in the region.The US Intervention and the Rise of InsurgencyThe US intervention in Iraq and its aftermath contributed to the rise and strengthening of an insurgency that eventually evolved into IS. It could be argued that, in many ways, the fall of Saddam Hussain and his Ba'athist regime was inevitable and just a matter of time. He was one of the longest ruling dictators of modern times, who invaded two neighboring states, destroyed and impoverished his country in unnecessary confrontations with his neighbors and the West, and was not shy to use chemical weapons against his own people. He came from the Sunni community of Iraq, who make up about 20 percent of the Iraqi population, and persecuted the country's Shias and Kurds who constitute about 60-65 and 15-20 percent of Iraqi population respectively. He might have been overthrown by the Arab Spring as was the case with Mubarak, Qaddafi and Ben Ali or may have faced an insurgency like Bashar al-Assad in neighboring Syria. It will never be known, as is the case with all counterfactual incidents. However, it may be said with confidence that with him in power the world would not have witnessed a large scale Sunni insurgency which eventually evolved into Islamic State.While al-Qaeda was a by-product of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the rise of IS was facilitated by the US intervention in Iraq in 2003. The Soviet invasion, which lasted for a decade from 1979 to 1989, led to an Islamists-led insurgency, attracting thousands of Afghan and foreign fighters. The US and its Western allies supported the Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviets by providing them money, arms and training through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). During this period, many Arab fighters, among them Osama Bin Laden, came to Afghanistan to take part in Jihad against the Soviet Union. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, many of these fighters returned to their countries to form or join radical groups to fight their governments. …