The “Right/Good” Distinction, the Harm Principle, and Liberal Neutrality

Abstract

We may compile a set of an individual’s interests in liberty which should be protected by a good legal system: bodily integrity, freedom of expression and of the communication of ideas, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice, privacy, protection from arbitrary interference, freedom of movement and choice of residence, freedom to adopt a life-style (including a so-called “non-orthodox” life-style) of one’s choice, etc. But reciting a list of liberties that the law should protect is just the beginning of an intellectual task, not its completion. The real problem is how to define and construe them in order to provide the standards for a resolution of the conflicts among them, or conflicts between these liberties and other important social interests. The challenging problem that a legal philosopher must face concerns, therefore, the limits of protected liberties, not a list of them.