THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN THE PRACTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE BODIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Abstract

The development of digital technologies affects the legal status of an individual. The task of constitutional justice is the constitutional interpretation of new legal phenomena such as the right to be forgotten. This article aims to analyze the right to be forgotten in the decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court and German Constitutional Court in a comparative aspect. The research methodology is primarily a dialectical method. This method helps the author to identify the content of the right to be forgotten, as well as to determine its role in relation to other constitutionally significant values. The comparative legal method is of particular importance for achieving the objectives of the research and helps to highlight the general and specific in the approaches of the courts to the concept of this right. This approach distinguishes the novelty of this research in comparison with other papers. The use of the dialectical and comparative legal research methods allows drawing the following conclusions. The distinctive feature of the right to be forgotten is its dualistic nature. On the one hand, this is a civil right associated with the right to privacy; on the other, it acts as a way to protect other constitutional rights (for example, the dignity of the individual). This right is not absolute. Some information may be of public interest. To resolve the issue of the prevailing constitutionally significant value in a particular case, the Russian Constitutional Court suggests using the method of finding a balance. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany emphasized that the right to free personal development and dignity sometimes prevails over freedom of information, especially considering the time factor in the case, as well as the degree of harm caused to a person by links to information posted on the Internet. The German Federal Constitutional Court, characterizing the legal relationship regarding the exercise of the right to be forgotten, highlights that this is a relationship between private subjects with fundamental rights, and refers to the concept of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights (“mittelbare Drittwirkung”) developed in German constitutional law. This article concludes that the decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the right to be forgotten are the guidelines for other courts, as well as the legislator for further improving legal regulation. Taking into account the development of information technologies, the author believes that the constitutional courts will more than once turn to the digital aspects of the legal status of an individual and, in particular, the concept of the right to be forgotten.