Abstract
This essay offers a framework for analysis of judicial dissent and examines Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion in the 1983 abortion decision against that backdrop. In addition to highlighting O'Connor's distinctive defense of personal credibility, emphasis on legal logic, and appeal for reversal of roe V. wade, the study reveals how effectively the value appeals characteristic of judicial rhetoric—democracy, justice, and logic—serve the motives for judicial dissent.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
