Abstract
ABSTRACT Long regarded by students of comparative politics as an important if muddled concept, oligarchy, as I define it, denotes modes of rule in which public office holders govern with a view to the private interests of the wealthy. The enabling condition in a democratic regime is weak institutional mechanisms of citizen representation and participation. The persistence of oligarchic modes of rule under democracy helps account for the enduring appeal of populism in Latin America. This article outlines the classical theory of oligarchy, examines the use of the concept in contemporary theories of comparative politics, describes oligarchic modes of rule in Latin America’s hierarchical market economies, offers an account of the dynamics of populist mobilisation and oligarchic modes of rule in Peru, and draws lessons from the Odebrecht corruption scandal.
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