Abstract

The view that if-clauses function semantically as restrictors is widely regarded as the only candidate for a fully general account of conditionals. The standard implementation of this view assumes that, where no operator to be restricted is in sight, if-clauses restrict covert epistemic modals. Stipulating such modals, however, lacks independent motivation and leads to wrong empirical predictions. In this paper I provide a theory of conditionals on which if-clauses are uniformly interpreted as restrictors, but no covert modals are postulated. Epistemic if-clauses, like those in bare conditionals, restrict an information state parameter which is used to interpret an expressive layer of the language. I show that this theory yields an attractive account of bare and overtly modalized conditionals and solves various empirical problems for the standard view, while dispensing with its less plausible assumption.

Highlights

  • The restrictor view of conditionals is usually understood as the view that the role of if -clauses is to restrict operators, typically quantifiers of different categories

  • The existing implementations of the restrictor theory require the presence of covert epistemic modals in the logical form of bare conditionals

  • She proposes to adopt a state that conditionally accepts the consequent on the supposition of the antecedent. This is the prediction we wanted for the assertion of a bare conditional. This discussion suggests an interpretation of bare conditionals which: (i) makes intuitive predictions about acceptance and assertion; (ii) interprets the if -clause in accordance with the restrictor view, as restricting a semantic parameter; and (iii) does not require us to postulate the presence of any covert operators in the logical form of bare conditionals

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Summary

Introduction

The restrictor view of conditionals is usually understood as the view that the role of if -clauses is to restrict operators, typically quantifiers of different categories. To appreciate the motivation for the view, consider the following sentences. If Alice takes the bus, she sometimes arrives late. B. If Alice took the bus, she might have arrived late. Thanks to two anonymous L&P reviewers for precious feedback, and to Lucas Champollion, Paul Egré, Matt Mandelkern, Adrian Ommundsen, Seth Yalcin, and Dietmar Zaefferer for discussions on topics related to this paper. Special thanks to Justin Khoo for detailed and insightful comments on a previous version of the paper, which led to substantial improvement

Ciardelli
Background on the restrictor view
Covert modals
Against covert modals
Proposal
Towards a solution: epistemic vocabulary and expressivism
Building the theory
Predictions
More evidence: conditional questions
Truth ascriptions
A uniform treatment of modals
Extension to attitude ascriptions
Conclusion
Full Text
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