The Resolving Power of a Scientific Theory as a Basis of its Epistemic Appraisal

Abstract

What does then, one might now ask, empirical science aim at? An adequate answer to this question will depend on how we view a scientific theory, in its nature and function, in particular in its relations of interaction with scientific problems themselves. The contemporary debates about the nature of quantum mechanics as a physical theory, that originate from Albert Einstein’s penetrating criticisms of it,1 are, I believe, quite significant and instructive in this context. I shall refrain from going here into the philosophically interesting aspects of this unended debate about quantum mechanics, as I intend to do so elsewhere. It should suffice here to point out that one of the assumptions on which Einstein’s criticism is based relates to his idea of a complete physical theory.2 The questions about quantum mechanics that Einstein asked himself and tried to answer quite naturally raise then questions of a similar nature about scientific theory in general, such as the following: When is a scientific theory a complete theory? Or, what makes a theory a complete scientific theory? I think that one could deal with the subject-specific question of the completeness of a physical theory such as quantum mechanics in a philosophically much better way if one first dealt with the more general question of the completeness of a scientific theory.KeywordsScientific TheoryPhysical TheoryTheoretical IdentificationResolve PowerStrong Gravitational FieldThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.