Abstract

Turkey was the first – and for decades the only – Islamic country to recognize the Jewish state, opening diplomatic relations in 1949. While Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, and Israel served during the Cold War as a Western ally to counter Soviet alliances in the Arab world, relations between the two states were low-key through the decades of wars fought between Israel and the Arabs. Yet Turkey never severed the relationship despite Arab pressure to do so. With the end of the Cold War, Israel and Turkey emerged as the most democratic and economically dynamic states in the region. Their foreign pro-Western orientation and their self-perception as bastions of democratic and free market values in an unruly neighbourhood placed them, as was the case during the Cold War years, in the same strategic boat. In the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, during a period when the Arab-Israeli peace process gained momentum, Israeli –Turkish relations also moved into high gear. Diplomatic ties were upgraded to embassy-level status, joint military exercises began and intelligence cooperation was expanded. In addition, economic relations boomed. Annual trade between the two nations grew to US$2 billion in 2004, up from US$200 million in 1993, and since the mid-1990s Turkey has been the number one tourist destination for Israelis. The remarkable upgrading of relations with Israel was the result of the emergence of a evolving international constellation, following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent adoption of a new Turkish approach to a newly defined Greater Middle East. Turkey benefited only partially from the ‘peace dividends’ at the end of the Cold War, because it still found itself in a volatile strategic environment. While free to adopt a more assertive foreign policy than during the Cold War, 1 it also viewed itself as encircled by dangerous neighbours and surrounded by hotspots of instability. Thus, the main context for Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel was the reorientation of its foreign policy.

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