Abstract

October 30, 2009, the GEM officially launched, which was an important step to improve China's capital market system. For the listed companies, investment efficiency is one of the three major investment decisions. Due to the short period of study, the research area is less related to the GEM listed companies.Theoretically, in the perfect market described by Modigliani and Miller, investment decisions are totally determined by investment opportunities, regardless of the impact of other factors. But in the real world of imperfections, agent problems and information asymmetry can lead to inefficient investment. From the point of view of the Principal-agent Theory and the Free Cash Flow hypothesis, the principal-agent conflict between the shareholders and the senior managers leads to the fact that the senior managers maximize their own utility and put the free cash flow into the project whose net present value is not greater than zero. In the information asymmetry theory and financing constraints hypothesis, the information asymmetry between the company and the external investors will make it difficult for external investors to make an accurate valuation of the company. To reduce the loss of the risk, they tend to underestimate the value of the company, so the financing cost of company in the capital market have been raised, and when the internal cash is in the shortage, the senior managers do not want to choose external financing with high cost to meet the investment need, to give up investment in project whose the net present value is larger than zero, resulting in underinvestment.At the level of empirical analysis, this paper chose the financial data and market transaction data of the GEM listed companies from 2010 to 2015 to study. Based on the Expected Investment Model of Richardson (2006), this paper used the generalized difference moment method (GMM) to estimate the expected additional investment, with the amount of investment, resulting in overinvestment and underinvestment. The conclusion is that there are overinvestment behavior and underinvestment behavior of the GEM listed companies in the research period.This paper measured the level of inefficient investment of listed companies on the GEM, so that the micro-subject in the multi-level capital market can clearly define the direction of its own need. In addition, we also hope to provide empirical reference for the policy makers in the formulation of relevant policies to create a good market environment for listed companies.

Highlights

  • October 30, 2009, China's formal establishment of the GEM, made the construction of the multi-level capital market system have improvement

  • In order to reduce the risk of loss, it tends to underestimate the value of the company so that the financing costs of company in the capital market is raised, and when the internal cash is in the shortage, the senior managers do not want to choose external financing with high cost to meet the investment needs, to give up investment in projects whose the net present value is larger than zero, resulting in insufficient investment

  • External financing is based on information asymmetry between the company and the investor, and it is difficult for the capital market to distinguish the quality of the company and to set interest rates in accordance with the average level of all companies, which leads to a better-performing company than above bear higher cost to get financing

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Summary

Introduction

October 30, 2009, China's formal establishment of the GEM, made the construction of the multi-level capital market system have improvement. The research angle of this paper is to measure the degree of inefficient investment of the GEM listed companies. This paper makes an empirical study on the inefficient investment level of listed companies on the GEM to lay the foundation for improving the investment efficiency of listed companies on the GEM, so that the micro-subject in the multi-level capital market can clearly define the direction of its own need. The second chapter reviews the four related theories and literatures of Principal-agent Theory, Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, Information Asymmetry Theory and Financing Constraint Hypothesis, providing theoretical basis for empirical analysis. The fourth chapter is the empirical analysis, and the Expected Investment Model is used to measure the difference between the expected investment and the actual investment of the GEM listed companies. The fifth chapter is the conclusion and the prospect, using the theoretical and the empirical analysis, draws the corresponding conclusion, and carries on the prospect to the future research

Principal-agent Theory
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis
Information Asymmetry Theory
Financing Constraint Hypothesis
Data Sources and Sample Selection
Model Design and Variable Definition
Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Correlation Test
Heteroscedasticity Test
Model Selection
Autocorrelation Test
Inefficient Investment Degree
Conclusions
Outlook
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