Abstract

This paper sets up models for the financial distress restructuring strategies in both cases that the interests of shareholder and manager are consistent or not in order to study the effect of restructuring strategies on the condition of "information asymmetry". Through the quantitative analysis of earning expectations of the shareholder, manager and creditor, this paper studied the optimal strategy of all the parties and their changes. Finally, this paper found that the two sides' optimal restructuring strategies to deal with financial distress were different when the interests of shareholder and manager were inconsistent. The manager could damage the benefits of the shareholder to maximize self-interest using his information advantage and domination. This article also addresses some corresponding recommendations to solve this issue.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.