Abstract
This article assesses the representational theory of measurement, found in mathematical psychology, which construes measurement as the representation of an empirical relational system by a formal mathematical system. To be measurable, a given empirical system must match the characteristics of a formal system, preferably cast in an axiomatic form. This critique argues that representational theory encounters a number of problems as a theory of measurement in natural science. It offers no special advantages as a methodology for social science measurement and needs to be supplemented by construct-related validation procedures
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
