The Rents of Illegal Logging: The Mechanisms behind the Rush on Forest Resources in Southeast Albania

Johannes Stahl

doi:10.4103/0972-4923.68916

Abstract

Since the collapse of socialism, Central and Eastern Europe has experienced a massive rush on forest resources. This paper examines the concrete mechanisms through which the postsocialist transformation has spurred this rush through a case study of a forest sector in southeastern Albania, where various kinds of actors collide in a struggle over rent from illegal firewood extraction and trade. I argue that the broader political and economic changes of postsocialism have altered rural resource values, changed the mechanisms through which forest users gain access to productive resources, and shifted the creation and distribution of resource rent among actors. Together, these changes affected forest users' incentives, decision-making and practices. Over the past two decades they have caused this rush and severe forest degradation.

Highlights

Central and Eastern Europe’s postsocialist transformation has introduced a tremendous amount of uncertainty about the values of rural resources
I focus on a case study from the Qafë Panje and Guri Nikes forest sector in southeastern Albania, where different kinds of actors collide in a struggle over rent from illegal firewood extraction and trade
Considering that there were about 100 independent woodcutters, 200 members of logging crews, and 35 firewood traders active in Qafë Panje and Guri Nikes in 2008, one can estimate the total amount of rent from the illegal firewood trade in the forest sector at more than 365,000 Euro

Summary

Introduction

Central and Eastern Europe’s postsocialist transformation has introduced a tremendous amount of uncertainty about the values of rural resources. These broad changes created previously unavailable rent-seeking opportunities for actors who are able to control access to agricultural land, forests, or other productive resources. I focus on a case study from the Qafë Panje and Guri Nikes forest sector in southeastern Albania, where different kinds of actors collide in a struggle over rent from illegal firewood extraction and trade.2 I use the concept of rent as a lens to describe and explain actors’ incentives, decisionmaking and practices.

Results

Conclusion