The remains of conditionality: the faltering enlargement of the euro zone

Abstract

When eight postcommunist states became European Union members in 2004, they committed to eventually joining the euro zone. But by 2005 the states' diverging preferences on pursuing rapid euro adoption had split them into ‘pacesetters’ (the Baltic states, Slovenia, and Slovakia) and ‘laggards’ (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary). This contrasts starkly with their previous agreement on the desirability of EU membership. Why did the conditionality of Maastricht prove less potent than that of Copenhagen? First, I argue that a domestic cost–benefit analysis turned the smaller new member states into pacesetters. Second, I argue that Maastricht conditionality has not only allowed but encouraged the laggards to further delay their entry. By making it possible for new member states to delay entry, by increasing the difficulty of the entry conditions, and by displaying internal problems undermining the euro zone's legitimacy and attraction, EU actors discouraged the laggards from making euro-zone entry a domestic priority.