The Relevance of Metaphysics to Behavior Analysis

Julian C Leslie

doi:10.1007/s40614-020-00277-5

Abstract

Behavior analysis takes a natural science approach to human and animal behavior. Some basic tenets are widely agreed in the field but it can be argued that some other assumptions are implicit in our approach and, if unexamined, may impair progress. Since the time of David Hume, there has been a strong Western philosophical tradition of naturalism and realism. Although behavior analysis has from the outset embraced pragmatism, features of naturalism are embedded in the metaphysics of science and thus have been imported into behavior analysis. Many versions of naturalism imply dualism, but this can be avoided without abandoning a naturalist–realist position either by adopting the historicist approach of Rorty, which suggests that apparently a priori truths are often merely conventions of a philosophical tradition, or by accepting Wittgenstein’s view that there are hinge statements that are fundamental to our thinking but are not propositional beliefs and do not entail dualism. As an alternative, we can adopt the metaphysical assumptions of monism, possibly starting from William James’s approach of neutral monism. Revising our metaphysical assumptions while retaining the pragmatism that is central to behavior analysis may enable us to engage more effectively with cognitive psychology, to develop stronger links with ecological psychology and other approaches that reject representationalism, and to move beyond the debate about the status of private events.

Highlights

Behavior analysis takes a natural science approach to human and animal behavior
Behavior analysis has from the outset embraced pragmatism, features of naturalism are embedded in the metaphysics of science and have been imported into behavior analysis
Many versions of naturalism imply dualism, but this can be avoided without abandoning a naturalist–realist position either by adopting the historicist approach of Rorty, which suggests that apparently a priori truths are often merely conventions of a philosophical tradition, or by accepting Wittgenstein’s view that there are hinge statements that are fundamental to our thinking but are not propositional beliefs and do not entail dualism

Summary

Neutral Monism as a Framework for Behavior Analysis

I have suggested that we, as Western scientists, are typically naïve realists and implicitly accept some form of naturalism. As behavior analysts, we are not dualists, in terms of philosophical classification, we are monists, monism being the view that denies the existence of a distinction or duality in a particular sphere, such as that between matter and mind. Clavijo-Alvarez (2019) suggested that we should be neutral monists, neither treating everything as material nor everything as mental, and could usefully adopt the framework developed by William James. James considered that other philosophers had generated representational theories because they assumed that only individual elements of the world could be directly perceived, but he denies that this is the case: “The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves” Monism: the mental and physical domains are part of a greater natural domain of elements and their functional variations. Behavior analysts typically strongly endorse the importance of phylogenetic continuity in learning processes, a position that is finding growing support in evolutionary biology (Van Duijn, 2017)

Wider Implications for Behavior Analysis

Conflicts of Interest None