The Relativity of Skepticism

Abstract

Pyrrhonian skeptics oppose positive and negative dogmatism. They hold both that (a) for all we know, we do not know anything, and that (b) for all we know, we know many things, including things about the external world. What, however, is the epistemic status of theses (a) and (b)? In particular, what do Pyrrhonian skeptics claim regarding the epistemic status of (a)? Do they claim to know that (a) is true? If so, they claim both that (c) we do know something regarding our knowing (viz. (a)), and that (a) for all we know, we do not know anything. Such a claim would be pragmatically odd, at best. Perhaps, in keeping with general agnosticism, Pyrrhonian skeptics will disclaim knowledge that (a) is true. What, however, should they claim about the epistemic status of (a)? Specifically, is it epistemically mandatory that every epistemologist be a Pyrrhonian skeptic? If so, what epistemic considerations make Pyrrhonian skepticism universally mandatory? Let's pursue these issues in connection with Robert Fogelin's Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. Regarding thesis (a), Fogelin comments: The Pyrrhonian is content to point out that certain show that for all we know we do not know anything. Having apprised others of these and the consequences that flow from them, he then challenges others to justify their continued use of knowledge claims (p. 66). Note Fogelin's use of 'show'. We are left wondering whether it aims to support a claim to know that (a). In any case, the radical possibilities central to Pyrrhonism are remote defeating possibilities. Fogelin explains: