The Relative Effectiveness of Simultaneous versus Sequential Negotiation Strategies in Auditor‐Client Negotiations

Abstract

AbstractSince most audit engagements identify multiple proposed audit adjustments, auditors must decide how best to present and negotiate these adjustments with their clients. Prior research indicates that auditors can negotiate adjustments individually (a sequential strategy) or can negotiate multiple adjustments within the same negotiation setting (a simultaneous strategy). This paper examines the relative effectiveness of a simultaneous versus sequential negotiation strategy in eliciting concessions from clients and engendering greater client satisfaction. Participants negotiated audit adjustments with a simulated auditor who employed one of the two negotiation strategies. We find evidence that a simultaneous strategy elicits significantly greater total concessions from client managers and also generates more positive attitudes toward the auditor. We also manipulate the magnitude of the issues negotiated and find that significantly greater concessions are offered when larger issues are presented first. These findings have important implications for auditors, as they suggest that negotiating issues simultaneously and presenting larger issues first can result in significantly improved negotiation outcomes.