The Relationship of Theory and Emancipation in Husserl and Habermas

Abstract

The most dramatic critique of the tendencies of modern science to identify itself as coextensive with all knowledge and to limit knowledge to solely objective facts occurs in Edmund Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Nevertheless another staunch critic of “scientism,” Jurgen Habermas, has more recently made sharp criticisms of Husserl’s major late work in his inaugural lecture of 1965, ℌKnowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective.” These criticisms are offered despite the fact that Habermas agrees with Husserl concerning the limitations of natural science and also shares with him the conviction that transcendental philosophy of the Kantian tradition can make a significant contribution toward overcoming the dominance of objectivism or positivism.1 According to Habermas, Husserl’s desire to trace a continuity from the attitude of wonder in classical Greek philosophy to the detached theoretical attitude of the phenomenologist ultimately defeats his own critical purposes, since the classical ideal of theōria actually supports the very scientific tradition he opposes. In contrast Habermas upholds the need to recognize an inherently practical interest in emancipation as underlying the drive for theoretical knowledge and both complementing and correcting the technological interest of modern science. If a historical continuity is to be sought within the intellectual tradition, it is to the classical notion of praxis Habermas directs us instead of its traditionally more favored counterpart.