The Relationship between Institutional Design and the Efficiency of a Jurisdiction

Abstract

Regional judicial bodies all serve to protect, interpret, and develop the law of the community in which they are established. While they share these common objectives, differences in admissibility, procedure rules, and jurisdiction can be noted. This study aims to shed light on differences in the design of jurisdictions; specifically, it explores whether they impact the efficiency of such courts. Our hypothesis is that institutional design can be used to fix issues – such as enforcement – that some Courts of Justice face. To test this theory, the study focuses on the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States. Using rational design theory, the study of the Court’s case law, its history, and empirical observations, we found that the particularities in admissibility and procedural rules, as well as the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, were established to bypass some issues linked to the lack of access to justice and weak rule of law in the area. The innovative institutional design allowed the court to be more efficient and helped to establish it as an alternative to national courts for citizens, which in turn promoted the rule of law in the region. However, some problems were left unsolved, and the Court today again faces issues it had managed to avoid in the past. This study concludes that institutional design can serve to create a more efficient judicial body, especially in complex regions. However, there is a risk of only observing short term effects if the adjustments made do not maintain a certain institutional equilibrium.