Abstract
Unlike their English-speaking counterparts, Japanese children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASDs) perform as well as typically developing (TD) children in comprehending metaphor, despite lacking 1st order theory of mind (ToM) reasoning. Additionally, although Japanese sarcasm and “indirect reproach” appear theoretically to need 2nd order ToM reasoning, HFASD children without this comprehended these forms of language as well as TD children. To attempt to explain this contradiction, we asked college freshmen to evaluate the strangeness (unconventionality) of these types of figurative language. We aimed to test the hypothesis that metaphor, sarcasm, and “indirect reproach” might be evaluated as more conventional than irony, which children with HFASDs do not comprehend as well as those with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The results for irony, metaphor, and “indirect reproach” supported the hypothesis, while those for sarcasm did not. Sarcasm is comprehended by HFASDs children as well as by TD children despite being evaluated as highly unconventional. This contradiction is discussed from a self-in-relation-to-other perspective. We postulate that a new explanation of disabilities of figurative language comprehension in children with HFASDs is needed instead of relying on a single cognitive process.
Highlights
As Norbury and Sparks [1] have suggested, autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) might be better understood when examined from a cultural point of view
No intergroup difference in comprehension of sarcasm, indirect reproaches, or indirect requests No intergroup difference in comprehension of sarcasm, indirect reproaches, or indirect requests Intergroup difference in comprehension of 1 metaphor unconventionality) matters rather than nonliterality. This appears to hold true regarding the high degree of strangeness of ironic statements in the present study,r which were poorly understood by children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASDs), and it is borne out by the low degree of strangeness of metaphors and “indirect reproaches,” both of which were understood by children with HFASDs
Findings of studies on Japanese children with HFASDs suggest that the development of theory of mind (ToM) reasoning is not the sole determinant of figurative language comprehension
Summary
As Norbury and Sparks [1] have suggested, autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) might be better understood when examined from a cultural point of view. Cross-cultural studies might help to refine cognitive theories of disorder that have been derived exclusively from North American and European investigations. This is the case for the comprehension of figurative language in autism [2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9], which seems to vary greatly between cultures in terms of ways of using metaphorical expression and saying something disagreeable. Sarcasm was defined as “the expression of one’s meaning by using words of the opposite meaning in order to taunt the hearer.” Irony was defined as “the expression of one’s meaning by using words of the opposite meaning in order to make one’s remarks forceful.” Sarcasm was defined as “the expression of one’s meaning by using words of the opposite meaning in order to taunt the hearer.”
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