Abstract
This paper investigates domestic origins of the cyclical pattern in Washington’s relationship with Beijing and Taipei. By focusing on the impact of U.S. presidential election, it argues that, during the election year, U.S. leaders adopt popular policies to achieve a greater number of votes. Such popular policies result in tensions between the countries and subdue the long-term U.S. strategic interests. After election, political leaders resume the long-term strategic interests. A generalizable maximum utility function model is developed to analyze and predict the impact of domestic politics on international relations.
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