Abstract

Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China’s current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China’s 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government’s reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government’s environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction.

Highlights

  • With the development of China’s economy, people’s basic living needs are gradually met, and the high-level needs such as a good living environment have been put forward [1]

  • The survey on Environmental Protection Awareness of Urban Residents in China in 2016 published by the Research Center of Public Opinion of Shanghai Jiaotong University shows that most urban residents are strongly dissatisfied with environmental pollution and regard environmental pollution as the most important problem to be solved by the government, and willing to contribute to improving the environmental quality

  • China emphasizes the construction of an environmental governance system with government as the leading factor, enterprises as the main body, social organizations, and public participation

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Summary

Introduction

With the development of China’s economy, people’s basic living needs are gradually met, and the high-level needs such as a good living environment have been put forward [1]. What is the impact mechanism of government supervision and public participation on enterprises’ environmental behavior? Government, and the public as three bounded rational game players, and construct an evolutionary game model of government supervision, public participation and enterprise pollution control, and discuss the evolutionary process and stability strategy. Based on the theory of spatial model, we build the spatial error model and spatial lag model, carry out further empirical research using 30 provincial panel data in China from 2009 to 2018, and provide suggestions for environmental governance from three perspectives of enterprise, government, and the public, which help to provide practical guidance and reference value

Literature Review
Construction of Evolutionary Game Model
Replicated Dynamic Equation and Evolutionary Stabilization Strategy
Equilibrium Point and Stability Analysis
Participants
Variable Description and Model Construction
Data Source
Analysis of Empirical Results
Conclusions
Full Text
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